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In State v. Miller,' fully discussed under "responsive ver-
dicts" (infra), the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of
simple rape where the girl submits while in a confused state of
mind after a brutal attack by the rapist. In such a case the jury
now has a choice of finding aggravated rape if the girl was "pre-
vented from resisting the act by threats of great and immediate
bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution, ' 2 or
simple rape if the girl may have ultimately consented at a time
when her normal resistance was prevented "by reason of . . .
abnormal condition of mind produced by ... any cause," such as
a terrorizing and brutal attack.8 This means, in practical effect,
that in almost all aggravated rape cases the jury has a legally
recognized compromise verdict of simple rape.
Theft - "Anything of Value"
In an effort to avoid the highly technical common law limita-
tions on "property" which might be the subject of the stealing
crimes, the Louisiana Criminal Code defined the phrase "any-
thing of value" employed in the theft 4 article along the broadest
possible lines.5 Even the all-embrasive definition provided was
not deemed broad enough to cover an indictment charging the
fraudulent procurement of a contingent fee contract in State v.
Picou.6 In this case, which has been previously noted in the
Louisiana Law Review, 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the contract had only a potential value, and was not a thing of
value within the definitions of the Criminal Code.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 237 La. 266, 111 So.2d 108 (1959).
2. LA. R.S. 14:42(2) (1950).
3. Id. 14:43(1).
4. Id. 14:67.
5. Id. 14:2 states: .'Anything of value' must be given the broadest possible
construction, including any conceivable thing of the slightest value, movable or
immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, public or .private. It must be construed in
the broad popular sense of the phrase, and not necessarily as synonymous with
the traditional term 'property'."
6. 236 La. 421, 107 So.2d 691 (1958).
7. 19 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 872 (1959).
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Murder - Intoxication and Specific Intent
Generally, voluntary drunkenness is not a defense, and the
intoxicated offender is subject to the same liability as the sober
man. However, the defendant's intoxicated condition may con-
stitute a defense where it "has precluded the presence of a spe-
cific criminal intent or of special knowledge required in a par-
ticular crime."" Thus in State v. Youngblood9 the Supreme Court
reversed a murder conviction where the trial judge had charged
the jury that voluntary intoxication could never be a defense to
a crime. This charge, reasoned the court, had denied the defend-
ants "the right to have the jury pass on the factual question of
whether they were in such an intoxicated condition as to preclude
the presence of a specific criminal intent."10 In order for the de-
fendant to be guilty of murder under clause (1) of Article 30 of
the Criminal Code, he must have had "a specific intent to kill or
to inflict great bodily harm." While an intent to kill or injure
is a common characteristic of the vicious drunk, the defendant is
entitled to submit evidence to show that he was so completely
out of his head from drink that he did not realize that he was
seriously injuring or killing a human being.
Miscegenation
Miscegenation is defined in Article 79 of the Criminal Code
as "the marriage or habitual cohabitation with knowledge of
their difference in race," between persons of the white and Negro
races. In State v. Brown" a conviction of miscegenation was
reversed because of the trial court's instruction, under which the
accused could be found guilty without any evidence that sexual
intercourse had occurred. In construing the word "cohabitation"
to require acts of sexual intercourse the Supreme Court followed
the prior jurisprudence concerning the use of the term in the
closely analogous incest crime. 12 Convictions under the Supreme
Court's interpretation, requiring proof of sexual intercourse,
will sometimes be difficult. If it is desired to define the offense
broadly so as to prevent the public scandal of members of the
•8. LA. R.S. 14:15(2) (1950).
9. 235 La. 1087, 106 So.2d 689 (1958), noted in 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
524 (1959).
10. 235 La. 1087, 1094, 106 So.2d 689, 691 (1958).
11. 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959), noted in 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
524 (1959).
12. LA. R.S. 14:79 (1950). This crime first appeared as Act 78 of 1884 and
"cohabit" had beeni held to mean sexual intercourse. State v. Freddy, 11.7 La.
121, 41 So. 436 (1906).
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Caucasian and Negro races merely living together, the remedy
is by legislation, rather than by loose judicial interpretation of
the language in a criminal statute.
13
Public Intimidation
The Supreme Court held, in State v. Daniels,14 that a state
penitentiary inmate who struck a guard who was seeking to
force him to go to the end of a "chow" line was not guilty of the
crime of public intimidation. 5 Speaking for the majority of the
court in its original reversal of the conviction, Justice Tate
stressed the fact that the state had not proven a specific intent
of the prisoner to influence the guard's conduct in relation to
his position, employment, or duty. The evidence, as outlined in
Justice Tate's opinion, clearly showed that the blow was struck
in instantaneous anger and resentment, rather than with an
active desire to induce the guard to do or to refrain from any
particular action. The Supreme Court reinstated the reversal of
the conviction on a rehearing. Justice Hamlin's majority opin-
ion stressed the general maxim "that penal statutes must be
strictly construed and cannot be extended to cases not included
within the clear import" of statutory language. 16 Expressing
the same thought as that stated in Justice Tate's opinion, the de-
cision continued: "The evidence reflects that the resentment of
the defendant displayed itself in a spontaneous act of mild vio-
lence and nothing more. It does not contain any showing that
the resentment and mild violence were for the purpose of influ-
encing the conduct of the officer in relation to his position, em-
ployment or duty." Looking to the comments of one of the Crim-
inal Code Reporters, 7 the court continued that "the conduct of
the defendant as set forth in the evidence is not even akin to
that expressed by the commentators." In short, the transgres-
sion complained of was a proper case for prison discipline, and
not within the basic intendment and purpose of the felony of
public intimidation. That crime, like the corresponding offense
13. It has been suggested that "the obvious uncertainty could be avoided, as
it has been in other jurisdictions with similar statutes, by legislative amendment
eliminating the word cohabit and substituting therefor more specific terminology,"
such as "live in adultery or fornication" or "live in and occupy the same room."
Note, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 700, 705 (1959).
14. 236 La. 998, 109. So.2d 896 (1959).
15. LA. R.S. 14:122 (1950).
16. 236 La. 998, 1023, 109 So.2d 896, 905 (1959).




of public bribery,'8 contemplates a situation where the defendant
has (as pointed out by Justice Tate in the original decision) a
specific intent to influence official conduct. The prisoner's in-
tent in the Daniels case was to express resentment against the
action of the guard, rather than to cause him to pursue a direct-
ed course of official conduct.
Validity of City Ordinance where State Statute Defines Offense
Section 40 (d) of Article XIV of the Louisiana Constitution
provides that state statutes "shall be paramount and no munici-
pality shall exercise any power or authority which is inconsistent
or in conflict therewith." Subject to this restriction a municipal-
ity may "adopt and enforce local police, sanitary and similar
regulations." City of Shreveport v. Baylock19 upheld a city ordi-
nance defining reckless driving as "driving a vehicle within the
city while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic
drugs." Defendant-appellant had contended that this ordinance
was in conflict with the state reckless driving statute20 which
defines the offense as operating a motor vehicle "in a criminally
negligent or reckless manner." The Supreme Court held that the
statutory definition of criminal negligence, as conduct which
"amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expect-
ed to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like cir-
cumstances,"' 21 was "broad enough to include driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs (specific-
ally prohibited by the ordinance under consideration). An act
of that kind is certainly one of the gravest and potentially most
dangerous types of motor vehicle operation. '22 As a make-
weight, the court pointed out that another Criminal Code article
also specifically made it a crime to operate a vehicle while
"under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs.""
Thus the court very logically concluded that "the inconsistency
or conflict contended for by relator does not exist. ' 24
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Prescription - "Made Known" Test
The one-year prescriptive period upon the charging of all
18. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950).
19. 236 La. 133, 107 So.2d 419 (1958).
20. LA. R.S. 14:99 (1950).
21. 1d. 14:12.
22. 236 La. 133, 138, 107 So. 419, 421 (1958).
23. LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950).
24. 236 La. 133, 139, 107 So.2d 419, 421 (1958).
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crimes, except a few very serious offenses which have no time
limitation, originally began to run from the date of the offense. 25
In 1844 the prescription law was changed so that the limitation
period began to run from the date when the offense was "made
known to a public official having the power to direct the investi-
gation or prosecution. '26 The "made known" rule was continued
in the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure,27 and the difficulties of
application of this test are well illustrated by the Louisiana juris-
prudence. The decisions are uniform that actual knowledge of
the defendant's offense is not necessary; and that it is sufficient
that the district attorney, a member of the grand jury, or the
judge has notice of facts that would put him on inquiry which
would have led to a discovery of the crime. In short, imputed as
well as actual knowledge of the crime will start the statutory
period. The difficult problem is a factual one as to when such
imputed knowledge exists. Analysis of the jurisprudence reveals
a very liberal attitude as to the information which will be suffi-
cient to put the district attorney on notice that the defendant has
committed a crime.28 In State v. Bagneris29 the Supreme Court
held that the district attorney had imputed knowledge of the
crime of conspiracy to commit public bribery from his study of
a Special Citizens' Investigating Committee report and from
facts revealed in prior gambling trials of ten of the defendants.
This information, according to the court, had clearly pointed to
the system of bribery and graft which was the basis of the pres-
ent indictment, and constituted sufficient knowledge to place the
district attorney upon inquiry and investigation as to the gam-
bling and bribery ring. The Bagneris case illustrates the diffi-
culty with Louisiana's made-known test, coupled with its short
one-year period of limitation upon the bringing of the charge.
Sometimes the district attorney may not, within that short
period, have assembled sufficiently convincing evidence against
some of the defendants to justify the filing of a criminal cirge:
Venue
The general venue article was amended in 194230 to provide
25. Crimes Act of 1805, § 37, ch. 50.
26. La. Acts 1844, No. 122.
27. LA.R.S. 15:8 (1950).
28. State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 199 So. 793 (1940), with strong dissent as
to whether the notice was sufficient; State v. Perkins, 181 La. 907, 160 So. 789(1935).
29. 237 La. 21, 110 So.2d 123 (1959).
30. LA. R.S. 15:13 (1950).
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that "where the several acts constituting a crime shall have been
committed in more than one parish, the offender may be tried
in any parish where a substantial element of the crime has been
committed." While this liberal provision has definitely mini-
mized the venue problem in Louisiana, it does not mean that the
prosecution may be brought in every parish having some connec-
tion with the crime. It is necessary that a "substantial element"
of the crime be found in the parish where the prosecution is
brought. In State v. Bloomenstiel3 a member of the Pontchar-
train Levee Board was indicted for public bribery 2 in St. James
Parish, which was the legal domicile of the levee board. Accord-
ing to the stipulated facts no bribe had been given, offered, or
received in St. James Parish. It was the state's contention that
St. James Parish had jurisdiction because that was where the
levee board was domiciled and acted. In holding that the St.
James Parish court was without jurisdiction the Supreme Court
stressed the fact that the district attorney had admitted by the
stipulated facts "that no overt acts were committed or occurred
in the Parish of St. James." The fact that the board was legally
domiciled in St. James was not conclusive, since the board was
empowered to act in any of the seven parishes constituting the
levee district. The principal basis of the decision, however, was
the finding that the crime of public bribery had been committed
entirely outside St. James Parish, since it was agreed that noth-
ing of value had been given, offered, or received in that parish.
Even if the resulting official conduct had been shown to have
occurred in St. James Parish, that parish would still have been
without jurisdiction. This is made clear when Justice Simon de-
clared: "It is the giving to or receiving of money or anything
of value, directly or indirectly, to a public official that, under
the statute, constitutes the crime. The unmistakable object of
the statute is to guard against the corruption of the mind of the
officer by receiving a bribe, or being offered a bribe by another.
Such corruption of the mind might, and most likely would, lead
to official misconduct, and hence the first step is made criminal,
without looking or waiting for results .... This step was taken,
it began and effectively completed the crime in some parish other
than St. James, and without any relation to what might there-
after occur in said Parish. ' 33 While St. James Parish may be
interested in, or even have suffered as a result of, the bribery,
31. 235 La. 860, 106 So.2d 288 (1958).
32. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950).
33. 235 La. 860, 866, 106 So.2d 288, 291 (1958).
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no element of the crime was committed in that parish and even
the liberalized provisions of the amended venue article were not
complied with. Similarly, in State v. Pollard4 a contractor who
fraudulently obtained money in Baton Rouge for road work
which was purportedly done in Caldwell Parish was not subject
to prosecution in the latter parish-despite the fact that the
impact of the wrong was most keenly felt in that area.
Recusation of the District Attorney
Recusation of the district attorney is not provided for in the
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure nor in the
Federal Rules; and there is not the same urgency for recusing
a biased district attorney as exists where the trial judge is con-
cerned. In Codes of Criminal Procedure of ten states, selected
at random from among those states having the most up-to-date
procedures, 35 only one included a statutory provision for recusa-
tion or disqualification of the district attorney, and that provi-
sion clearly recognizes the discretionary nature of the trial
judge's power to order the recusal 36 Possibly this explains the
Supreme Court's rather liberal decision upholding the trial
judge's refusal to recuse the district attorney on the ground of a
"personal interest" in State v. Melerine.37 In Melerine two mem-
bers of the police jury were charged with malfeasance in office,
and a motion to recuse the district attorney was based on allega-
tions that he was personally interested in having the defendants,
who were of a different political faction, removed from office.
The Supreme Court took the view that the allegations as to the
district attorney's financial profit from the defendants' removal
from office were "mere speculation." The gist of the Supreme
Court's opinion appears to be that political considerations, as
distinguished from personal financial considerations where the
district attorney is involved in a related civil suit 8 will not be
looked upon with favor as a ground of recusation of the district
attorney.
Present Insanity
State v. Yaun 9 is of special interest because of the Supreme
34. 215 La. 655, 41 So.2d 465 (1949), discussed in 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
207 (1950).
35. The states were California, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin.
36. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 56.110 (Vernon, 1951).
37. 236 La. 881, 109 So.2d 454 (1959).
38. State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108 (1936).
39. 237 La. 186, 110 So.2d 573 (1959).
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Court's elaboration of the meaning of the test of Article 267 of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that
a defendant shall not be tried where the court finds that
"through insanity or mental deficiency [he] is not able to under-
stand the proceedings or to assist in his defense." After restat-
ing the Supreme Court's former pronouncement of the test of
present insanity in State v. Swails,40 Justice Hamlin continued:
"This court is in agreement with the foregoing pronouncements
in the Swails case, supra, and a person accused of crime is not
sane in legal contemplation unless he is able to understand
the nature of the proceedings against him and assist in his de-
fense in a rational manner and to a rational degree. Possession
of any degree of ability to understand and assist less than ra-
tional would subject an accused to a disadvantage of such mag-
nitude as to deprive him of his rights and liberty without due
process of law."
"Wha constitutes ability to understand and assist must of
necessity be determined by a careful consideration of all the facts
and circumstances in each particular case. This Court knows of
no arbitrary criterion by which the degree of sanity or capacity
of any particular human mind may be established with reason-
able certainty. The Court can only consider the evidence intro-
duced in this case bearing upon the present sanity or insanity of
this particular accused and determine therefrom whether, in the
light of all the circumstances, this particular accused is able to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him and render
rational assistance to counsel in his own defense." '41
While the issue of present insanity will always be one to try
the perspicuity of trial judges, Justice Hamlin's clear statement
in the Yaun case will be of material assistance.
Discrimination in Selection of Juries
In appealing from a narcotics conviction in State v. Fletcher,42
defense counsel urged that the Negro appellant had been dis-
criminated against by systematic exclusion of members of his
race from the general jury venire and the petit jury panel, "and
that this exclusion was accomplished by arbitrary and dispro-
portionate limiting of their number by said jury commissioners,
40. 223 La. 751, 66 So.2d 796 (1953).
41. 237 La. 186, 202, 110 So.2d 573, 578 (1959).
42. 236 La. 40, 106 So.2d 709 (1958).
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who had not sufficiently acquainted themselves with the qualifi-
cations of all potential jurors in the Parish of Orleans." 43 . De-
fense counsel's motion to set aside the jury venires had not been
supported by evidence as to the number of Negro names in the
general jury venire, nor as to the number of Negroes actually
called for jury duty. This evidence was available, by subpoena
duces tecum, from the records of the jury commission. Thus
there was no specific evidence to establish the alleged discrimi-
nation or to overcome the general presumption "that public of-
ficials do their duty in accordance with law."' 44 The testimony
of the chairman of the jury commission had been to the effect
that the names of persons to which subpoenas had been sent to
appear for possible jury service were taken from "the city di-
rectory, the telephone directory and the rolls of the registrar of
voters," and that the commission had not known or taken into
account the race of those persons whose names were placed in
the general venire jury wheel. 45 Then the case was distinguished
from Eubanks4" and Cassel47 where the appellant had cited fig-
ures showing that "although the communities in which the juries
were drawn contained a substantial number of Negro citizens,
no Negroes were ever called for jury service, or a token number
were systematically included." 4 It was too late for defense coun-
sel to supply these figures first in its motion for a new trial, and
a subpoena duces tecum, for the purpose of securing the records
of the jury commission relative to the drawing of the jury ve-
nires was properly refused. It is well settled that a defendant
waives possible objections to the method of selecting the jurors
by going to trial. He cannot go to trial on the merits and then
raise defective jury proceedings after conviction. 49 Claims as
to racial discrimination in the selection of jurors were also insuf-
ficiently supported by the evidence in State v. Jenkins50 where
defense counsel failed to produce evidence as to the percentage.
of Negroes qualified to serve as jurors, and where exclusion of
the Negroes from the petit jury was largely explained by their
stated objections to capital punishment. In State v. Rue5 a
43. Id. at 44, 106 So.2d at 710.
44. Id. at 47, 106 So.2d at 712.
45. Id. at 46, 106 So.2d at 711.
46. State v. Eubanks, 232 La. 289, 94 So.2d 262 (1957) ; 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
47. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950)
48. 236 La. 40, 50, 106 So.2d 709, 712 (1958).
49. State v. White, 193 La. 775, 192 So. 345 (1939).
50. 236 La. 256, 107 So.2d 632 (1958). Accord, State v. Scott, 237 La. 71,
110 So.2d 530 (1959).
51. 236 La. 451, 107 So.2d 702 (1958).
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Negro defendant had been convicted of aggravated rape and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. No actual racial discrimination was
shown, since three Negroes had served on the grand jury and two
were on the petit jury that convicted the defendant; but denial
of equal protection was urged on the basis of the special rule
applying to Orleans Parish which authorizes the criminal dis-
trict judge to "select" the grand jury from the grand jury list
of seventy-five or more names which is drawn from the jury
wheel by the jury commissioners.5 2 In overruling this conten-
tion the Supreme Court held that a mere possibility of discrimi-
natory administration of the grand jury selection provision did
not render it unconstitutional. Otherwise every provision vest-
ing discretion in the jury commission or court would be rendered
unconstitutional. The court further held that no provision of the
State or Federal Constitution prevented the legislature "from
providing as it has done a different method of jury selection for
the metropolitan area of Orleans Parish than for the other par-
ishes of the State, and we fail to see how defendant appellant has
been prejudiced by or has ground to complain of such historic
differentiation."5 3 While there is no constitutional issue in-
volved, a query may be raised as to whether there is any logical
or practical basis for Orleans Parish procedures differing from
the remainder of the state in regard to where the process of se-
lecting specially qualified veniremen for grand jury service
occurs. In other parishes the grand jury list is selected from
the general venire by the jury commission, and then the grand
jurors are drawn from an envelope by the sheriff.54 This pro-
cedure is not one, like the size of the jury venires, where popu-
lation differences justify different rules in the metropolitan and
urban districts.
Objections, based upon racial discrimination in the selection
of juries, are complicated by the nebulous and much litigated
provision of Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Where the objection is leveled at the indictment, State v. Scott 55
holds that it cannot be urged by a motion to quash the indict-
ment at the arraignment; but must be filed in conformity with
the time and manner specified in Article 202.
52. LA. R.S. 15:196 (1950).
53. 236 La. 451, 457, 107 So.2d 702, 704 (1958).
54. LA. R.S. 15:180, 184 (1950).
55. 237 La. 71, 110 So.2d 530 (1959).
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Qualifications of Jurors
The first special cause for which a juror may be challenged
under Article 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedue is that "he
is not impartial," but it is expressly provided that "an opinion
as to guilt or innocence of the accused, which is not fixed, or has
not been deliberately formed, or that would yield to the evidence,
or that could be changed, does not disqualify the juror." Thus
in State v. Davis6 jurors in a murder trial, who had read news-
paper accounts of the murder, were not subject to challenge
when they stated on voir dire examination that they would dis-
regard what they had read and would be governed entirely' by
the evidence produced at the trial. Defense counsel's claim that
the newspaper articles had placed the defendant's character in
issue before any character evidence was introduced was properly
overruled. To have upheld such a claim would have made it ex-
ceedingly difficult to secure a jury in a much publicized murder
or rape case, and would have virtually emasculated the very
practical Code limitation upon prejudice or bias as a ground for
challenge of a juror - i.e., that it shall not disqualify if the
prospective juror is sure that he can disregard his temporary
opinion and decide the case solely upon the evidence adduced at
the trial.
Indictments
Where the short form indictment authorized by Article 235
is employed, the minimal averments stated must be fully com-
plied with.57 However, a precise tracking of the short-form lan-
guage is not required. In State v. Durbin" a bill of information
alleging that defendant did "willfully, maliciously and felonious-
ly rob Amos Gwin" was held to constitute sufficient compliance
with the short form "AB robbed CD." The appropriate rule is
very clearly and succinctly stated by Justice McCaleb who de-
clared: "While it is true that this court has said [citing cases]
that it is essential for the prosecution, when using the short
form, to adhere strictly thereto, this rule does not require a lit-
eral tracking of the language of the short form. It suffices that
the words used by the pleader unmistakably convey the same
meaning as those contained in the short form."' 9 The additional
56. 237 La. 577, 111 So.2d 778 (1959).
57. State v. Broussard, 233 La. 866, 98 So.2d 218 (1957).
58. 235 La. 989, 106 So.2d 443 (1958).
59. Id. at 991, 106 So.2d at 444.
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language "willfully, maliciously and feloniously" was consid-
ered as "surplusage," thus neither adding to nor detracting from
the allegation that the defendant had robbed the victim named.
Added support for the Supreme Court's decision may be found
in the express statement in the short form article that the indict-
ment may "in addition to the necessary averments of the appro-
priate short forms ... also include a more particularized state-
ment of the facts of the offense charged.. .. without affecting
the sufficiency of the short form ... "
In State v. McCrory6O a simple burglary information was up-
held which charged that the defendant "did violate R.S. 14:62 in
that you entered without authority a structure known as Putt's
Place, the property of Adam Walker, with intent to commit a
theft therein." This information was held sufficient in that it
had set forth "every element of the crime of simple burglary as
defined in Article 62 of the Criminal Code." '61 It would, however,
have been much simpler to have followed the short-form indict-
ment and charged that "Melvin J. McCrory committed simple
burglary of a structure known as Putt's Place belonging to Adam
Walker." It could have then been added, without in any way
threatening the validity of the short-form, that the structure was
entered "with intent to commit a theft therein."
In State v. Coleman,6 2 a negligent homicide case, the Supreme
Court continued its policy of upholding short-form indictments
complying with the specific forms set out in Article 235. Short-
forms were also upheld for such well defined crimes as murder,68
attempted murder,6 4 and aggravated rape.65
Time for Filing Objections to the Indictment
State v. Durbin6 applied the well-settled rules that formal de-
fects in the indictment must be urged in limine at the arraign-
ment.67 While the court may permit the filing of a motion to
quash at any time before trial on the merits, 8 it is too late to
raise formal defects in the indictment for the first time by a
60. 237 La. 747, 112 So.2d 432 (1959).
61. LA. R.S. 14:62 (1950).
62. 236 La. 629, 108 So.2d 534 (1959).
63. State v. Eyer, 237 La. 45, 110 So.2d 521 (1959).
64. State v. Elias, 234 La. 1, 99 So.2d 1 (1958).
65. State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So.2d 530 (1959).
66. 235 La. 989, 106 So.2d 443 (1958).
67. LA. R.S. 15:284 (1950).
68. Id. 15:287.
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motion in arrest after conviction. The alleged defect in the Dur-
bin case related to the sufficiency of a short-form indictment for
simple robbery, which had varied somewhat from the stipulated
form of "AB robbed CD."
Responsive Verdicts
The Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Marsh,
field,69 that the trial judge must instruct the jury as to all re-
sponsive verdicts regardless of the evidence adduced at the trial,
stands in distinct contrast to the general American rule that
there is no duty to instruct in lesser and included offenses where
there is no evidence tending to prove such offenses.70 The Lou-
isiana rule is also contrary to the position taken in Section
1.08 (5) of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code which
states: "The Court shall not charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense." (Emphasis added.) 71 Speaking of
instructions on lesser and included crimes, Lester Orfield states:
"When the facts show that the defendant is either guilty of. the
crime charged or not guilty of any crime, instructions as to lesser
crimes need not be given. The same is true where the evidence
clearly shows that the major crime was committed, the only ques-
tion being whether the defendant committed it. If no evidence
is offered on which conviction of a lower offense could be sus-
tained, the court need not instruct as to such lower offense. '72
The Marshfield decision is largely based on the special wording
of Article 386 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
which states: "Whenever an indictment sets out an offense in-
cluding other offenses of a lesser magnitude or grade, the judge
shall charge the jury the law applicable to all offenses of which
the accused could be found guilty under the indictment. ... "
(Emphasis added.) The illogical nature and practical difficul-
ties inherent in the Louisiana mandatory instruction rule are
illustrated by the recent case of State v. Miller.78 In that case a
69. 229 La. 55, 85 So.2d 28 (1956).
70. See cases collected in Comment, 17 LOUISIANA LAW RzvIEW 211, 212, n.
2 (1956).
71. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(5) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956). In
explaining this provision, the Reporter, Herbert Weschler, states: "Instructions
with respect to included offenses in such cases might well be an invitation to
the jury to return a compromise or otherwise unwarranted verdict."
72. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 456 (1947). Accord, Comment, 17 .Loisi'
ANA LAW REVIEW 211 (1956).
73. 237 La. 266, 111 So.2d 108 (1959).
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defendant was charged with aggravated rape and the state's evi-
dence had been directed entirely to the proof of sexual relations
accomplished by force and threats of force. No evidence had
been submitted showing that the alleged victim was intoxicated
or mentally deficient at the time of the act. However, the trial
judge followed the rule of the Marshfield case and gave the jury
full and complete instructions as to the legally responsive verdict
of simple rape. Under the facts adduced at the trial the appro-
priate verdicts would appear to have been guilty of aggravated
rape as charged, guilty of attempted aggravated rape if the vic-
tim had resisted at first but had at last willingly consented, or
not guilty. However, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
simple rape. Defense counsel urged, in a motion for a new trial,
that there was "not the slightest scintilla of evidence" in sup-
port of the jury's verdict of guilty of simple rape "since none of
the elements of this particular offense were brought forth and
elicited on the trial." The practical effect of sustaining defense
counsel's motion would have been to turn him completely free,
since the verdict of guilty of simple rape had operated as an im-
plied acquittal of the crimes of aggravated rape and attempted
aggravated rape.74 In affirming the trial judge's ruling that the
jury could properly convict of simple rape, the Supreme Court
approved the judge's per curiam statement that: "It is reason-
able to believe that the jury found that the defendant's extreme
cruelty and overbearing determination resulted in at least a par-
tial breakdown of the girl's powers of resistance and built up
confusion, thereby creating in her an 'abnormal condition of
mind' causing incapacity to [further] resist .... The testimony
of the prosecuting witness at pages 50-54 and the pictures of her
bruises are convincing evidence that she was threatened, choked,
beaten and manhandled into such a state of fear of her life and
mental confusion and at least such an abnormal condition of her
mind that submission resulted. ' 75 A motion in arrest of judg-
ment was based on the claim that simple rape was not a respon-
sive verdict since the crime of aggravated rape did not contain
all the elements of simple rape. This motion had been overruled
for similar reasons, the trial judge pointing out that if the vic-
tim did not resist the defendant's force and threats to the utmost
74. State v. Harville, 171 La. 256, 130 So. 348 (1930), holding that verdict
convicting of the lesser and included crime or manslaughter operated as an acquittal
of the charge of murder, and that when a new trial was granted on the man-
slaughter conviction the implied acquittal of murder still remained effective.
75. 237 La. 266, 277, 111 So.2d 108, 112 (1959).
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which would have been aggravated rape, she was at least thrown
into such an abnormal condition of mind as to preclude her giv-
ing a valid consent to the sexual relations. "This abnormal state
of mind, which is one of the ingredients of simple rape, is, there-
fore, always included within the greater crime (aggravated
rape) .-76 It may be stretching the meaning of clause (1) of the
simple rape article7 7 to hold that it applies to an "abnormal
condition of mind" from fear, which is not sufficient to consti-
tute submission as a result of threats of great bodily harm (ag-
gravated rape).78s The same result could have been reached by
an analysis of the inherent nature of the rape crimes as defined
in Articles 41 through 43 of the Criminal Code. The general
definition of Article 41 stresses the fact that the sexual inter-
course must be "without the [victim's] lawful consent." Under
Article 42 the crime is aggravated rape when the offense is com-
mitted without the girl's consent because her resistance is over-
come by force or harm. Under Article 43 the lesser crime of
simple rape is committed when the act "is deemed to be without
the lawful consent of the victim" because of various factors
which precluded her "understanding the nature of the act." It
is logical to conclude that the situation of a consent vitiated by
lack of understanding will constitute a lesser degree of the crime
of aggravated rape which requires the act to be committed
against the girl's will. This would be analogous to the homicide
situation where the intentional killing was murder and (prior
to the 1948 responsive verdict statute) the offense was only neg-
ligent homicide if the mens rea element was criminal negligence
rather than a specific intent to kill or seriously injure.7 9 Then,
too, it could have been reasoned that the defendant was bene-
fitted, rather than harmed, by the simple rape verdict in a force
and fear situation.80 At any event, since the trial judge and the
Supreme Court were convinced that Miller was not an innocent
man, they ruled correctly in not reversing the possibly too len-
ient simple rape conviction.
A more exacting approach to the responsive verdict problem
was taken by the Supreme Court in State v. Clayton,81 where the
court held that a verdict of unauthorized use of movables8 2 was
76. 237 La. 266, 282, 111 So.2d 108, 114 (1959).
77. LA. R.S. 14:43 (1950).
78. Id. 14:42(2).
79 State v. Stanford, 204 La. 439, 15 So.2d 817 (1943).
80. State v. Malmay, 209 La. 476, 24 So.2d 869 (1946).
81. 236 La. 1093. 110 So.2d 111 (1959).
82. LA. R.S. 14:68 (1950).
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not responsive to the charge of issuing worthless checks. Re-
sponsive verdicts for the crime of issuing worthless checks were
not spelled out in the 1948 responsive verdict statute 4 and so the
question of responsive verdicts was to be determined by general
rules established in the jurisprudence. The sole question, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, was whether all of the essential ele-
ments of the crime of unauthorized use of movables were in-
cluded in the crime charged of issuing worthless checks. The
court stressed the differences in the intent elements of the two
crimes, i.e., that issuing worthless checks required a specific in-
tent to defraud, while unauthorized use of movables was com-
mitted where goods were taken or obtained without any intention
to deprive the owner of the movable permanently. It may be
suggested that the crime of unauthorized use of movables does
not require any specific intent, and merely includes a statement
negating the requirement of the crime of theft 5 that there must
be a specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of the
property taken. Since issuing worthless checks is a specialized
form of theft by "fraudulent conduct, practices or representa-
tions," it could have been held that unauthorized use of movables
is a responsive verdict to issuing worthless checks when the evi-
dence shows that the defendant did not intend to keep the prop-
erty (thing of value) obtained by the bad check. Under the re-
sponsive verdict statute unauthorized use of movables is respon-
sive to a charge of theft. However, the specialized nature of the
crime of issuing worthless checks, and the fact that the related
general crimes of theft and unauthorized use of movables have
been paired together in the Criminal Code, might well justify a
conclusion that the crimes are not generic and should not be
treated as different degrees of the same basic crime.
In State v. Kelly8 6 the Supreme Court held that a verdict of
an attempt to commit crime against nature was responsive to a
charge of crime against nature. Chief Justice Fournet succinct-
ly and clearly summarized the basis of the decision when he
stated: "As the charged crime is not specifically listed in Article
386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 27 of the Louisi-
ana Criminal Code, defining an attempt as 'a separate but lesser




86. 237 La. 991, 112 So.2d 687 (1959).
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"Inasmuch as all the elements of the charged crime, i.e., crime
against nature, with the exception of completion, being present
in the attempt to commit such crime, the verdict of attempt to
commit crime against nature was responsive to the charge.
'5 7
Bills of Exceptions
Several cases applied the well-settled general rule that the
Supreme Court has no basis for a review of the trial court's
actions and rulings, unless the defendant has reserved and per-
fected bills of exceptions to the irregularities complained of, or
where the error is patent on the face of the record.8 Even
where the testimony taken during the trial has been transcribed,
the Supreme Court will not consider such testimony unless it has
been presented in a duly perfected bill of exceptions.8 9 The for-
mal bill of exceptions is prepared by counsel for the defense and
is based upon exceptions which have been reserved during the
trial.90 Under Article 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the
court stenographer is ordered "to take down the facts upon
which the objection and the ruling are based, together with the
objection, ruling and reasons." This transcription is often dic-
tated by defense counsel who will naturally see that the court's
ruling is presented in a manner favorable to the defense's objec-
tion. While the judge may be forced to sign the bill of excep-
tion by mandamus, he has the privilege of attaching a per curiam
statement with his version of the circumstances and facts under-
lying his ruling. Where there is a discrepancy between the state-
ment of facts in the bill of exceptions and the judge's per curiam,
the Supreme Court accepts the statement of the trial judge.91
State v. McCrory9 2 applied the well-settled rule that, in the ab-
sence of a per curiam, the court will accept the statements con-
tained in the bills of exceptions as correct.
Motion in Arrest
A motion in arrest of judgment lies only for a substantial
defect "patent upon the face of the record, ' 93 which is defined
87. Id. at 1003-04, 112 So.2d at 691-92. Accord, State v. Robinson, 221 La.
119, 58 So.2d 408 (1952), discussed 13 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 341 (1953).
88. State v. Scber, 238 La. 11, 113 So.2d 292 (1959) ; State v. Pitcher, 236
-a. 1, 106 So.2d 695 (1958); State v. Bennett, 235 La. 987, 106 So.2d 443
(1958) ; State v. Thomas, 235 La. 985, 106 So.2d 442 (1958).
89. State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959).
90. LA. I.S. 15:504 (1950).
91. State v. Itobertson, 196 La. 982, 200 So. 320 (1941).
92. 237 La. 747, 112 So.2d 432 (1959).
93. LA. R.S. 15:517 (1950).
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in the Code of Criminal Procedure as an error "discoverable by
the mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without
any inspection of the evidence, though such evidence be in the
record." Applying this formula the Louisiana Supreme Court
has held that an error in the judge's charge, which was in writ-
ing and appeared in the transcript, did not constitute a part of
the record and could not be reached by a motion in arrest of
judgment.9 5 On the other hand a substantial defect, such as the
omission of an essential element of the crime in a long-form bur-
glary! indictment, will be the basis of a motion in arrest of judg-
ment.9 0 The indictment is clearly considered a part of the for-
mal record. 7 In State v. Picou9 s a short-form theft indictment
was invalidated by the fact that the bill of particulars charged
that the defendant attorney had procured a contingent fee con-
tract which, according to the Supreme Court, was not the taking
of a thing of value. Following its prior decisions99 the Supreme
Court held that the state was bound by the bill of particulars,
which limited it to proof of facts which did not constitute theft.
In permitting this defect to be raised by a motion in arrest of
judgment the court held that both the indictment and the bill
of particulars furnished were a part of the formal record. After
stressing the fact that an error is patent on the face of the rec-
ord when it is discoverable from an inspection of "the pleadings
and proceedings" without the inspection of evidence, Justice
Hamiter concluded: "Clearly, a bill of particulars filed in con-
nection with a short-form indictment or information, to which
particulars a defendant is entitled on the tendering of a proper
94. Id. 15:503.
95. State v. Daleo, 179 La. 516, 154 So. 437 (1934), where the court stated
a practical reason for the rule "that it is not considered proper that the defendant
sit idly by while the judge is making an erroneous charge to the jury, taking
his chances upon the verdict, and if against him, then by assignment of error or
motion in arrest to take advantage of it." Accord, State v. Knight, 227 La. 739,
80 So.2d 391 (1955), holding that an error in the -written list of verdicts given
the jury is not part of the formal record and cannot be raised by motion in arrest
of judgment.
96. State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934).
97. State v. McCrocklin, 130 La. 108, 109, 57 So. 645, 646 (1912) holding
that the record includes "the caption in a criminal case, a statement of time and
place of holding the court, the indictment or information with the indorsement,
the arraignment, the plea of the accused, mention of the impaneling of the jury,
verdict, and judgment of the court."
98. 236 La. 421, 107 So.2d 691 (1958), noted in 19 LouISmAiNA LAW REVIEw
872 (1959).
99. State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So.2d 622 (1949); State v. Bessar, 213
La. 299, 34 So.2d 785 (1948).
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and timely motion therefor, constitutes an essential part of the
pleadings and proceedings of the cause."'"
Habeas Corpus
The jurisdiction over a habeas corpus proceedings concern-
ing the validity of the imprisonment of an inmate in the state
penitentiary was clearly enunciated in Johnson v. Sigler.'10 In
that case the Supreme Court held that after the defendant was
placed in the custody of the warden of the state penitentiary, the
district court of the parish of his conviction no longer had juris-
diction over him; and the habeas corpus proceedings should be
brought in the district court of the parish in which he was being
detained. Justice Ponder pointed out that under the controlling
constitutional1 0 2 and statutory 0 3 provisions the jurisdiction is
"where the imprisonment exists."
State ex rel. Womack v. Walker'0 4 held that, although an ap-
peal will lie in a habeas corpus proceeding involving a civil mat-
ter, a judgment granting a writ in a criminal case is not ap-
pealable. "The reason for this procedural rule of law is that the
delay which generally attends an appeal would defeat the very
purpose of the writ which has for centuries been esteemed the
best and only sufficient safeguard of personal freedom, designed
to give immediate relief from illegal confinement to those who
may be imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver them
from unlawful custody."' 1 5 In State ex rel. McIsaac v. Sigler' 0e
the Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction to re-
view a denial of a writ of habeas corpus in a criminal case. Jus-
tice McCaleb analyzed the controlling constitutional provisions
and broadly declared, "it has been well settled that we are with-
out appellate jurisdiction of habeas corpus proceedings in crimi-
nal cases... since the 67th Article of the Constitution of 1845
vested it [Supreme Court] with original jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus at the instance of persons in actual cus-
tody in all criminal cases of which the court was given appellate
jurisdiction, this grant of original power '... precluded the ex-
100. 236 La. 421, 429, 107 So.2d 691, 694 (1958).
101. 235 La. 1056, 106 So.2d 469 (1958). Accord, State ex rel. Weston v.
Walker, 236 La. 95, 107 So.2d 298 (1958).
102. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
103. LA. R.S. 15:114 (1950); LA. CODE OF PRACmCE art. 793 (1870).
104. 236 La. 129, 107 So.2d 417 (1958).
105. Id. at 131, 107 So.2d at 418, n. 2.
106. 236 La. 773, 109 So.2d 89 (1959).
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ercise of an appellate jurisdiction in relation to the same sub-
ject.' "107
Appeal from City Court Judgments
District courts have appellate jurisdiction from city court
judgments, except where the penalty imposed is such as to give
the Supreme Court jurisdiction. These appeals are "tried de
novo" ;108 and the defendant has an automatic right to this sec-
ond trial in the district court regardless of the fairness and reg-
ularity of the trial in the city court. The re-trial is a completely
new trial, subject only to a recently added general limitation
that only. evidence and defenses presented in the city court shall
be presented at the district court trial.10 9 In State v. Debose 10
a city court conviction for drunken driving was appealed to the
district court. The district court, after a trial de novo, affirmed
the conviction and added a thirty-day jail sentence to the $150
fine imposed by the city court. In setting aside the additional
jail sentence, the Supreme Court followed a prior decision hold-
ing that "the provision of the law that, when one who has been
convicted in the city court appeals to the district court, the trial
shall be de novo, does not mean that the sentence shall also be
de novo."' Thus the convicted defendant may "have his cake"
(the lenient city court's sentence) and "eat it too" (get a second
trial where the district court may reverse the city court and find
him innocent).
107. Id. at 779, 109 So.2d at 91.
108. LA. CONST. art. VL1, § 36.
109. Ibid., as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 561.
110. 235 La. 875, 106 So.2d 294 (1958).
111. State v. Langston, 142 La. 292, 295, 76 So. 717, 718 (1917).
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